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Liability of Trustees Under CERCLA
Remains an Unanswered Question
PATRICIA L. QUENTEL*
ELIZABETH HENRY WARNER**
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)l was passed in 1980 in response to
increasing concerns about hazardous waste in America. CERCLA
is essentially a strict liability statute,' assigning joint and several
liability- for the costs of hazardous substance cleanup to four clas-
ses of potentially responsible parties (PRPs): those who are cur-
rent owners or operators of a facility contaminated by hazardous
substances, those who owned or operated the facility at the time
hazardous substances were disposed, those who arranged for
transport of hazardous substances, and those who accepted haz-
ardous substances for transport." Significantly, because liability is
joint and several, one PRP may bear the entire financial burden of
cleaning up a hazardous waste site if other PRPs are insolvent or
otherwise unable to contribute to the cleanup costs.
* Associate, Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, P.A., Charleston, South Carolina; J.D.,
1988, University of Wisconsin; B.A., 1983, Lawrence University.
** Associate, Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, P.A., Charleston, South Carolina;
J.D., 1989, University of South Carolina; B.A., 1986, University of South Carolina.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
2 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding Congressional intent for strict liability in the absence of a specific provision).
* Courts have consistently held that liability is joint and several. See, e.g., County
Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (stating that
joint and several liability is imposed upon resposible parties regardless of fault). However,
if a potentially responsible party can demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the harm
is divisible, then the party will be made to pay only for its share. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo,
883 F.2d 176, 178 (lst Cir. 1989) ("The rule adopted by the majority of courts, and the
one we adopt, is based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts: damages should be appor-
tioned only if the defendant can demonstrate that the harm is divisible.") (citing United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 169, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Bliss, 667
F. Supp. 1298, 1312-13 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 809-11 (S.D Ohio 1983)) (emphasis added).
' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4)(1988).
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Institutional trustees5 should exercise caution before agreeing
to administer a trust holding real property. If hazardous waste
cleanup is initiated at the property, trust assets will be utilized to
satisfy CERCLA liability. However, due to the unsettled nature
of the trustee's CERCLA liability and the view of financial insti-
tutions as "deep pockets," the institution may be required to cover
any cleanup costs which cannot be satisfied by the trust's assets.6
Congress provided an exception to the strict, joint and several
liability of owners and operators of hazardous waste sites. CER-
CLA specifically exempts from liability an owner or operator who
"without participating in the management of a . . . facility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the ... facility."' 7 During the early years of CERCLA implemen-
tation, secured creditors assumed, in reliance on this security in-
terest exemption, that they would not be held liable for cleanup
costs if they held indicia of ownership but did not participate in
the management or control of the facility. As time passed, how-
ever, secured creditors realized that because CERCLA did not de-
fine what constituted participation in the management of the facil-
ity, the judiciary was called upon with increasing frequency to
interpret and define the scope of "management" and determine
the situations under which a secured creditor, holding indicia of
ownership, would remain within the security interest exemption. 8
This article focuses on the potential liability of institutional trustees operating pursu-
ant to the terms of a trust agreement or under a will. The potential liability of individual
trustees under a will, bankruptcy trustees, or other court-appointed trustees is beyond the
scope of this article.
I See generally Trustee Liability Under CERCLA , [21 News & Analysis] Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 (Jan. 1991).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(1988).
* See. e.g., Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Co., LTD., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding that the port authority was not the "owner" under CERCLA because the
port did not participate in management of the property where a lead recycling plant was
located and only held the deed as part of a transaction to finance the plant); United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[A] secured creditor will
be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to
support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so
chose."), cert. denied. 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co.,
732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that the security interest exemption does not
apply to a lender that purchases the property at the foreclosure sale); United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (finding a bank which




As a result, lenders found themselves increasingly at risk for bear-
ing the costs of their borrowers' hazardous waste problems.
In an attempt to provide guidance to both secured creditors
and the judiciary, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
issued a final rule ("Rule") 9 in April 1992 which purported to
define more clearly the scope and application of the security inter-
est exemption set forth in CERCLA. 1 The Rule set forth a range
of activities that lenders, financial institutions, and other secured
creditors may undertake while nonetheless falling within the safe
harbor afforded by the security interest exemption. The Rule also
offered definitions of certain key terms in CERCLA in an effort to
assist creditors and the judiciary in interpreting and applying the
statute.
However, the Rule did not address the question of whether
institutional trustees or fiduciaries fall within the security interest
exemption under CERCLA. Consequently, the Rule offered no
protection from CERCLA liability to bank trust departments,
thereby creating the possibility of great financial losses to institu-
tions should the trust assets be depleted during the cleanup of a
hazardous waste site."
During the Rule's comment period, many trust companies
and trust departments of lending institutions argued that the Rule
governing secured creditors should be extended to explicitly in-
clude institutional trustees." In particular, the trustees were con-
cerned that the financial institution acting as a trustee under the
terms of a trust or a will could potentially face liability for CER-
CLA cleanup costs if the trust held real property contaminated
with hazardous waste.1 " The trustees further noted that they
should not be held personally liable for the cleanup of trust
properties because they conceivably could not know whether the
trust property were contaminated, nor could they have acted to
57 Fed. Reg. 18,343 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100).
10 After this article was submitted for publication, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, vacated the EPA's Rule. See 1994
WL 27881 (D.C. Cir. February 4, 1994). Two petitions have been filed for rehearing en
bane, and it is expected that the full Circuit Court will rehear the matter.
" See EPA's Proposed Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA: No Panacea for
the Financial Services Industry, 121 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,618, 10,622 (October 1991). As these commentators wrote: "This potential liability will
also likely discourage persons from serving as bankruptcy trustees (or other trustees),
positions that have increased significance in the current economic climate." Id.
0 57 C.F.R. 18,343, 18,349 (1992).
L Id.
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prevent such contamination.14 Finally, many of the comments
urged that liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs should be
satisfied from the trust assets and should not be extended to the
institution absent some wrongdoing by the trustee.15
The EPA justified the Rule's failure to address trustee's lia-
bility on the basis that "neither the section 10](20)(A) security
interest exemption nor any other section of CERCLA makes any
special provision for trustees.""8 The EPA explained that " 'inno-
cent' trustees or fiduciaries are not liable under CERCLA.
1 7
EPA further explained that it was "incorrect" to assume that "a
trustee is personally liable under CERCLA solely because a trust
asset is contaminated, even if the trustee had no knowledge of the
asset's contamination and was in no way involved in the activities
that resulted in the contamination."18 In most instances, only trust
assets would be used for cleanup of the property. The EPA con-
cluded that the personal liablility of trustees already was ad-
dressed by existing law and there was no legal basis to extend the
security interest exemption to include trustee liability when indi-
cia of ownership is not held primarily to protect a security inter-
est.1 9 However, the EPA admitted that a "trustee or other fiduci-
ary with respect to a facility (or any person) who holds indicia of
ownership in the vessel or facility primarily to protect a security
interest may assert the exemption." 20
This Article discusses the ways in which the Rule neglects to
consider the role of the institutional trustee as a security interest
holder and then summarizes the current case law addressing trus-
tee liability. Finally, it suggests certain policies and procedures by
which institutional trustees may protect themselves and their trust
assets.
1. DEFINITIONS UNDER THE RULE
The Rule has provided several key definitions under CER-
CLA which may assist in analyzing the potential liability of insti-




z 57 Fed. Reg. 18,343, 18,349 (1992).
Id.
19 Id.
21 57 Fed. Reg. 18,343, 18,375 (1992).
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Rule defines "indicia of ownership" broadly to include the follow-
ing as a security interest in real or personal property: a mortgage,
deed of trust, lien, surety bond, guarantee of obligation, title held
pursuant to a lease-financing transaction, legal or equitable title
obtained pursuant to foreclosure, assignments, pledges, and other
forms of encumbrances against property that are held primarily to
protect a security interest. 1 Clearly, the ownership interests held
by an institutional trustee fall within this broad definition; thus,
the trustee qualifies as an "owner" of a site.22 Moreover, an insti-
tutional trustee who manages trust portfolios which lease trust
property may also face liability under CERCLA as an "operator"
if it contracts for workers at a site13 or if the trust engages in the
leasing of its property to others.
2 4
The Rule also defines a "holder" of a security interest to in-
clude initial and subsequent holders as well as receivers. 5 The
Rule interprets the crucial phrase "primarily to protect a security
interest" to mean "that the holder's indicia of ownership are held
primarily for the purpose of securing payment or performance of
an obligation." 26 If indicia of ownership are held primarily for in-
vestment purposes, such indicia will not be considered to be held
"primarily to protect a security interest" and the secured creditor
will fall outside the scope of the security interest exemption.
7
The Rule clarifies the application of the security interest ex-
emption and sets forth a two-prong test for determining what will
constitute "participating in management" of the debtor that will
bring a secured creditor within the rubric of CERCLA liability
for cleanup costs.2" However, the Rule left unanswered the extent
" 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a) (1992).
" See Trustee Liability Under CERCLA, supra note 6, at 10,003 (stating that CER-
CLA section 107(a)(l) "makes trustees directly liable under CERCLA.").
" See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991)(finding the trustee's liability was predicated on the fact that
the trustee had contracted with workers to clean up the site in anticipation of sale).
2 Environmental Cleanup Liability for Trustees Next Land Mine in CERCLA Field,
Attorney Warns, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2862 (Apr. 24, 1992).
" 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (a)(l) (1992).
2 40 C.F.R. § 300.A100(b)(1992).
17 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(b)(2)(1992); See also 57 Fed. Reg. 18,343, 18,375 (1992).
28
A holder is participating in management, while the borrower is still in pos-
session of the . . . facility encumbered by the security interest, only if the
holder either: (i) Exercises decision making control over the borrower's envi-
ronmental compliance, such that the holder has undertaken responsibility for
the borrower's hazardous substance handling or disposal practices; or (ii) Ex-
1993-94]
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to which institutional trustees or the trusts which they administer
may be held liable for costs incurred in removing hazardous waste
from trust-held real property."9 It remains unclear whether, and to
what extent, an institutional trust department may be liable for
cleanup costs in the event a trust holds contaminated property.3 0
A trust's acquisition of contaminated property clearly can be
fraught with concerns for the institutional trustee. Under CER-
CLA's strict liability scheme, it is well-settled that a purchaser of
contaminated property becomes an owner of that property and
thereby liable for hazardous waste cleanup costs. Acquisition of
property by other means may permit the new owner to escape lia-
bility; in order to do so, however, the new owner must show either
that the property was devised to him through inheritance or be-
quest, or demonstrate that he "did not know and had no reason to
know" of the contamination."'
The defenses to CERCLA liability which are available to the
trustee are limited. An otherwise responsible party may avoid lia-
bility by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that
the hazardous waste contamination was the result of an act of
God, an act of war, or an act of a third person.32 In 1986, Con-
gress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA), 3 which further restricted the third party
defense. Now, in order to successfully assert the third party de-
fense, the potentially responsible party must demonstrate that he:
(1) was contractually unrelated to the third party responsible for
the contamination; (2) exercised due care with respect to the haz-
ardous substances; and (3) took precautions against a third party's
foreseeable acts or omissions. 4 CERCLA's defenses prove prob-
lematic for the institutional trustee because the trustee is bur-
dened with determining all the past and present uses of the real
property held in trust. Furthermore, demonstrating to the EPA
ercises control at a level comparable to that of a manager of the borrower's
enterprise . .. with respect to (a) Environmental compliance or (b) All, or
substantially all, of the operational (as opposed to financial or administra-
tive) aspects of the enterprise other than environmental compliance.
40 C.F.R 300.1100 (c)(l)(i)-(ii).
29 The potential liability of bankruptcy trustees is beyond the scope of this article.
See generally Trustee Liability Under CERCLA, supra note 6.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i)(1988).
32 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(l)-(3)(1988).
I Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)(codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 24 U.S.C.)[hereinafter SARA].
34 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)-(a)(b)(1988).
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that the trustee did not have knowledge of the uses when the prop-
erty entered the trust may prove increasingly difficult as trustees
attempt to act with due diligence towards the assets held in trust.
In some cases where a trustee's knowledge of the history of the
land is inadequate, it may be difficult for the trustee to determine
whether real estate held in trust has the potential for a hazardous
waste problem. If the property is held distantly by the trust, it
may be expensive for the trustee to determine the condition of the
property.
The trustee also may avoid liability by demonstrating that
the contaminated property was acquired through inheritance or
bequest and that it "did not know and had no reason to know" of
the presence of hazardous substances.3" The trustee may have to
undertake an environmental audit in order to show that it had
made "appropriate inquiry" under CERCLA.A The trustee also
can avoid liability if it can demonstrate that the contamination
occurred after the trust acquired the property.37
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION WITH RESPECT TO TRUST
HOLDINGS.
Several recent cases have highlighted issues of concern to po-
tential trustees, with the courts addressing both the existence and
extent of trustee liability under CERCLA. The rulings on these
issues provide little comfort to those persons or institutions nomi-
nated as trustees.
In United States v. Burns,"8 the United States sued one of the
defendants, an individual who was trustee and beneficiary of a
35 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i)(1988).
36 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) provides:
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in
[section 9601(35)(A)(i)], the defendant must have undertaken, at the
time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership
and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or custom-
ary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the pre-
ceding sentence the court shall take into account any specialized
knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship
of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated,
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the
property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contam-
ination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination
by appropriate inspection.
37 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(Supp. 1992).
38 No. C-88-94-L, 1988 WL 242553 (D.N.H. 1988).
1993-941
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trust,3 9 for response costs under section 107 of CERCLA.4 The
defendant moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that as trus-
tee he never owned the land subject to the lawsuit and that he did
not personally participate in conduct that violated CERCLA. In
analyzing the issue of whether or not the trustee was liable as an
"owner" under CERCLA, the court found three distinct ratio-
nales upon which to base its decision.
First, the court looked to existing case law and found that the
courts have uniformly held that the term "owner" should be con-
strued broadly.4 Then the court turned to the legislative history
of CERCLA and found that it suggested "[a] broad meaning for
'owner' which was intended 'to include not only those persons who
hold title to a vessel or facility, but those who, in the absence of
holding a title, possess some equivalent evidence of ownership.' " 2
Finally, the court directed its attention to trust law and found that
the fundamental principles provided that the trustee held legal ti-
tle to the property and "could be liable for obligations as the
owner of the property."
4 3
The court seemed determined to address the issue of trustee
liability in Burns. Since the defendant was both the trustee and
beneficiary of the trust, the court could have bypassed the issue of
trustee as owner and focused on the issue of beneficiary as
owner.4 Nonetheless, the court found that a trustee who took title
was an owner under CERCLA. The Burns court held that the
trustee/beneficiary
was as much an "owner" . . . as would be a lessee. Furthermore,
as trustee and beneficiary of the Trust that owned the [hazard-
ous waste site], [the trustee] possessed at least some evidence of
ownership of the [site]. Congress did not intend for a responsible
party to be able to avoid liability through the use of a trust or
Interestingly, the court did not hold that the trust was fraudulent, despite the fact
that the trustee, as beneficiary, was essentially a fiduciary to himself. See Trustee Liability
Under CERCLA, supra note 6, at 10,004.
" Section 107 of CERCLA authorizes any person, state, tribe, or the EPA to bring
an action against the responsible parties to recover any response costs incurred during the
cleanup of a contaminated site. See 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1988).
4' Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 WL 242553 at *1.
Id. (citing H.R REP No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6181).
43 Id.
44 The significance of this decision by the Burns court was not lost on the court in




other forms of ownership. Furthermore, as trustee, [the defend-
ant] held legal title to the trust property and under trust law
could be liable for obligations as the owner of the property. "
Thus, the court made no distinction with regard to the fact that
the trustee in Burns was an individual rather than an institution.
Clearly, under Burns, a trustee who takes title to the property is
an owner under CERCLA and liable for hazardous waste cleanup
costs.
In City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co.4 ("Phoenix "),
the plaintiff filed a section 107 cost recovery action"7 against Val-
ley National Bank, the testamentary trustee which had exercised
an option to purchase a landfill site in 1966. The defendant moved
for summary judgment, arguing that it was not an "owner" under
CERCLA.'8 The court undertook an analysis patterned after
Burns, noting that "[t]he legislative history for CERCLA seems
to take for granted that any titleholder is an 'owner' under the
statute ' 49 and that "[t]he EPA's practice seemingly is to argue
that trustees are 'owners' within the meaning of CERCLA. 5 0
The court interpreted EPA's then-proposed Rule, disagreeing
with the defendant's position that innocent trustees or fiduciaries
were not liable under CERCLA. The court stated:
The EPA's proposed rule deals with the liability of secured cred-
itors only. It is not controlling where a trustee is not also a se-
cured creditor. Indeed the preamble to the proposed rule states
that it 'does not address trustees because neither . . . security
interest exception nor any other Section of CERCLA makes any
special provision for trustees. '
The court reasoned that "if Congress had meant to exempt
uninvolved trustees from liability as 'owners' under CERCLA, it
16 Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 WL 242553 at *2 (citing AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WIL-
LIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 265, 265.1 (3d ed. 1985)).
" 816 F. Supp. 564 (D. Ariz. 1993)("Phoenix I").
'7 See supra note 40.
8 Other issues in the case were whether the trust was estopped from denying owner-
ship of the site because it had already argued that it was the owner in a condemnation
action and whether it had "operator" liability since it had no involvement in the everyday
activities on the site.
" Phoenix 1, 816 F. Supp. at 567.
Id. at 568 (citing Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Horman Family Trust, 960 F.2d 917,
921 (10th Cir. 1992)).
11 City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co., 816 F. Supp 564, 568 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(citing 57 Fed. Reg. 18,343, 18,349).
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would have said so in the statute," and found that a trustee could
be liable as an "owner" under CERCLA.52
After the court in Phoenix I held that the trustee could be
liable as an "owner" under CERCLA, the trustee moved for par-
tial summary judgment on the issue of the extent of the trustee's
liability. 3 In Phoenix H, the trustee argued that its liability under
CERCLA was limited to the trust assets and did not extend to the
trustee's non-trust assets. Since this issue was one of great concern
to banks and trust companies, several filed amicus curiae briefs on
behalf of the trustee. 4
In considering the question, the court again looked to the
CERCLA statute and legislative history for guidance, but found
nothing in the statute or legislative history which addressed the
issue.55 Next, the court looked to existing common law to deter-
mine the extent of trustee liability. The court noted that "the law
governing trustee liability is well settled, and is nearly uniform
throughout all jurisdictions."5
Applying the Restatement (Second) of Trusts to CERCLA
section 107(a), the court developed the following "general rules
governing the CERCLA liability of trustees as owners of contami-
nated property":
1. Where a trustee is held liable under subsection 107(a)(1) as
the current owner of contaminated property, the trustee's liabil-
ity is limited to the extent that the trust assets are sufficient to
indemnify him.
2. Where a trustee is held liable under subsection 107(a)(2), but
the trustee did not have the power to control the use of trust
property, the trustee's liability is limited to the extent that the
trust assets are sufficient to indemnify him.
3. Where a trustee had the power to control the use of trust
property, and knowingly allowed the property to be used for the
6' Id.
, City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co., 827 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1993) ("Phoe-
nix 1I").
" The American Banker's Association, National Trust Real Estate Association, IBJ
Schroder Bank and Trust Company, Northern States Trust Company, and United States
Trust Company filed or joined in the filing of an amicus brief in support of the trustee's
position. Id. at 602 & n.2.
Phoenix II, 827 F. Supp. at 602.
I d. at 603. But see U.S. v. Peterson Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346
(D.N.D. 111. 1992), in which the court found a trustee not an "owner" under CERCLA




disposal of hazardous substances, then the trustee is liable under
subsection 107(a)(2) to the same extent that he would be liable
if he held the property free of trust. 7
The court determined that the trustee in Phoenix I had the
power to control the use of the property and knowingly allowed
hazardous waste to be disposed of on the property.58 Therefore, it
reasoned, the trust could be personally liable for response costs. 59
Although the amici argued that a trustee should not be held
liable beyond the assets held in trust unless the trustee were some-
how at fault, the court rejected this argument, stating that the
fault based argument "completely ignores the fact that CERCLA
is not a fault based scheme. Liability of property owners is based
upon the concept that the disposal of hazardous substances is an
ultrahazardous activity. . . .Liability is based on the defendant's
decision to engage in ultrahazardous activity, not on the defend-
ant's culpability."6
Phoenix II is helpful to trustees because it provides some pa-
rameters for predicting whether their potential liability will extend
beyond the trust assets with regard to future nominations. How-
ever, given the Phoenix II court's holding that a trustee is an
"owner" under CERCLA, a trustee presently holding trust assets
can take little comfort in its title of trustee if it has knowingly or
unknowingly allowed the use of trust property for hazardous waste
disposal.
III. DEFENSES AND PROTECTIVE STEPS AVAILABLE TO THE
INSTITUTIONAL TRUSTEE
It is clear that the EPA Rule does not provide any safe har-
bor to trustees and that trustees can expect that their potential
liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs will continue to evolve
along the lines of trust law. Since trust law may vary from state to
state, some trustees may be more vulnerable than others for liabil-
ity for cleanup costs. 61 Clearly, under Phoenix II, only those trust-
" Phoenix i1, 827 F. Supp. at 605.
" City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co., 827 F. Supp. 600, 607 (D. Ariz.
1993)("Phoenix II").
I' d.
60 Id. (citing Nurad, Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir. 1992)).
SI Compare Phoenix II, 827 F. Supp. at 603 (construing Arizona law) with United
States v. Peterson Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346 (D.N.D.lII. 1992) (construing
Illinois law) wirh United States v. Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 WL 242553 (D.N.H.1988).
1993-94)
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ees who actually permit disposal of hazardous waste on trust prop-
erty will be held personally liable for cleanup costs.
As discussed above, the CERCLA defenses, although limited
in scope, may provide some relief to the institutional trustee in
certain instances. Depending upon the circumstances, the trustee
may be able to claim that it is an innocent purchaser of property.
Under other circumstances, the trustee may find a safe harbor by
arguing that the trust received the property through inheritance or
bequest.
Since institutional trustees are viewed as the proverbial "deep
pocket," these institutions should adopt a policy which requires
the periodic review of every single property in trust portfolios, as
well as a review of all property at the time the trustee assumes its
responsibilities. In order to avoid potential liability for hazardous
waste cleanup, the prudent institutional trustee should inspect any
property before it becomes a part of the trust portfolio. As a prac-
tical matter, the institutional trustee appointed under the terms of
a will may have very little time to ferret out environmental
problems before the property becomes part of the trust's assets.
Furthermore, trustees should consider drafting language into
trust documents which may protect them from liability for
cleanup costs. Such language could provide that no real property
would pass under the terms of such documents until the trustee
has had a reasonable time to investigate the property and deter-
mine whether the trust should hold it. With respect to institutional
trustees serving under the terms of a will, it probably is more diffi-
cult to draft such protective provisions.
In addition, the institutional trustee should consider inserting
express language in trust documents which would permit the trus-
tee to use trust funds to pay for any hazardous waste cleanup
which is subsequently discovered. The institutional trustee should
also consider including an indemnification clause in the trust doc-
ument to allow the trustee to recover cleanup costs which exceed
trust costs.
While an institution may act affirmatively to reduce or elimi-
nate liabilities in trust portfolios at the time the trustee assumes
its trust duties, such steps will not necessarily ensure that the trus-
tee will avoid liability. Certainly, trust departments must under-
take zealous due diligence with respect to land held by trusts
before the trustee accepts the land as part of the trust portfolio. A
trustee may not know the past uses to which a property has been
put and may not precisely know the present uses as when, for ex-
[VOL. 9:421
TRUSTEE LIABILITY
ample, the trust holds property in another state or a location
which precludes easy access to, and inspection of, the real prop-
erty. Under some circumstances, the cost of a Phase I examina-
tion6" is easily justified due to the potential for future liability.
Institutional trustees must promulgate and adopt policies to
prevent or minimize potential liability for hazardous waste
cleanup costs. As a reasonable measure, institutional trustees
should begin to subject certain trust holdings, such as commercial
properties, to annual inspections. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) has instructed banks and institutions to de-
velop procedures to limit exposure to liability for hazardous waste
cleanup costs.63 Although the guidelines were set up to limit liabil-
ity with respect to loans, it could be expected that the FDIC
would encourage lenders to set up internal procedures to assess
potential exposure to cleanup costs in the trust context.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, if an institutional
trustee conducts periodic reviews of trust properties to ascertain
whether any contamination problems have occurred and discovers
a problem, the trustee still must decide whether the risk of contin-
uing to hold the property in a trust portfolio outweighs the prop-
erty's benefit to that portfolio. Of course, if the property is con-
taminated, then the trustee has become an owner of the hazardous
waste site. Such ownership status raises the potential for a trus-
tee's conflict of interest. While the trustee has an obligation to its
institutional employer, it has a correlating obligation to discharge
its fiduciary duty with the best interests of the beneficiaries of the
trust in mind. To use trust assets to clean up the property may be
in the best interests of the trust beneficiaries; this may not be so if
trust assets are completely depleted. Furthermore, using trust as-
sets to finance the hazardous waste cleanup could expose the trus-
tee to suit for breach of fiduciary duty if the beneficiaries argue
that the trustee failed to exercise due diligence in investigating the
trust property before accepting it into the trust. Certainly, an in-
vestigation of the real property comprising a trust should be made
82 A Phase I assessment is an initial assessment of a hazardous waste site involving a
review of the past and present uses of the property, an on-site inspection and a review of
the chain of title and of any state and federal agency reports with respect to the site.
Oftentimes, surrounding properties are inspected and records and title are reviewed to as-
sist in determining whether there may be spillage or leakage of hazardous substances from
an adjoining property onto the property under investigation.
13 See Banks, Thrifts Must Set Up Programs to Limit Environmental Liability,
FDIC Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3110 (Apr. 9, 1993).
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before the trustee accepts its position. To act otherwise would sub-
ject the trust, and perhaps the trustee, to potential liability for
hazardous waste cleanup costs.
For the trustees who have held certain trust portfolios for
many years, it is far more difficult to avoid liability if property has
been contaminated with hazardous waste. If the trustee investi-
gates currently held trust property and discovers contamination,
disposal of the property will not affect the trustee's liability as an
owner in the chain of title. Under CERCLA's strict liability
scheme, the institutional trustee may be liable for hazardous
waste cleanup costs no matter how quickly it moves the contami-
nated property out of the trust portfolio.
CONCLUSION
Some problems posed by the potential liability of trustees for
hazardous waste cleanup costs may be avoided through careful
drafting techniques. Whether such self-protective provisions them-
selves pose a conflict of interest between the institutional trustee
and the trust beneficiaries should be considered in implementing
such provisions.
Institutions should exercise due diligence and investigate the
history of real property before accepting the position of trustee.
By not accepting responsibility for certain properties and refusing
to hold them in trust, the institution will avoid liability for hazard-
ous waste cleanup costs that can extend to both the trust assets
and the institution itself.
For those trustees currently holding contaminated property
the outlook is bleak. Trust assets will be used, perhaps even to the
point of exhaustion, to clean up contaminated property. If those
assets prove insufficient, then the institution itself may find itself
paying for the balance of the cleanup costs.
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